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Article
On 22 March 2016, just before 8:00 a.m., two bombs exploded 
in Zaventem Airport in Brussels. A few minutes later, the first 
pictures from the airport started to circulate on Twitter. One of 
the most shared tweets, posted by Anna Ahronheim (a journal-
ist herself), attracted the attention of many journalists on 
Twitter. In the video, the destroyed front of the airport is visi-
ble, and panicked people are running away from the building. 
Subsequently, Anna Ahronheim received many requests from 
journalists who wanted to use the material in their coverage, 
and the video, attributed to her, quickly made its way into live 
coverage on TV and online news pages. A few hours later, 
after the video had already been aired on TV, Ahronheim 
tweeted again to clarify that she did not record the video her-
self, that it was shared with her in a WhatsApp group, and that 
she did not personally know the source (Galvin, 2016). 
However, while her original tweet had already been shared 
over 20,000 times at this point, her clarification did not attract 
much attention. Even months after the attack, the video with 
the wrong attribution was still visible in international media 
outlets such as Mail Online and Le Monde.
This example illustrates many of the aspects we are con-
cerned with in this article. In times of crisis, journalists have 
always been pressed to react quickly—a pressure that has 
increased considerably in 24/7 online news environments, in 
which competition is constantly present (Van der Haak, 
Parks, & Castells, 2012). Being quick is seen as paramount 
in many news organizations—but aiming for quickness also 
puts journalists in a dilemma. Established criteria for jour-
nalistic quality control, of source identification, verification, 
and even information about being the object of coverage, are 
in danger of being compromised or, sometimes, even jetti-
soned. This loss of quality is not surprising since newsrooms 
have shrunk significantly in most media organizations 
(Klinenberg, 2005), workloads have risen, and the time 
available for research has decreased considerably. The pres-
sure for journalists to react quickly and the worsened condi-
tions to do so are particularly problematic when online 
sources need to be verified. “Networked journalism” (Van 
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der Haak et al., 2012) allows journalists to access a large 
number of sources on the Internet and particularly on Twitter, 
and to do so quickly. Such online sources are often not rec-
ognized, established institutions, but individuals whose abili-
ties, intentions, and honesty are often less clear.
Evidence for sourcing and verification on Twitter has been 
found in previous studies by surveying journalists (Heravi & 
Harrower, 2016), analyzing news organizations’ general veri-
fication, and sourcing practices of user-generated content 
(UGC) (Bruno, 2011) or in content analysis of tweets from a 
few journalists during crisis situations (Hermida, Lewis, & 
Zamith, 2014; Vis, 2013). Still, no study so far has analyzed 
journalists’ sourcing and verification practices on Twitter dur-
ing a crisis event in a systematic way and on a global scale. 
This study attempts to do so by pursuing three goals: First, we 
assess to what extent the sourcing and verification on Twitter 
have become a global practice and how the observed media 
organizations and employees making use of these practices 
can be characterized. Second, we analyze a large sample of 
requests by journalists in the form of replies, thus specifically 
describing the sourcing and verification process on Twitter 
and measuring the speed of this action.1 Third, we investigate 
the sourced content and explain why some content receives 
more attention than other. Choosing a crisis like the Brussels 
attacks allows us to assess whether professional norms are met 
when journalists source and verify over Twitter in situations of 
high pressure and uncertainty and to identify possible ethical 
conflicts that arise in such situations.
Conceptual Framework: Journalism, 
UGC, and Crises
Changing Journalism
Online media have changed journalists’ professional routines 
in various ways, two of which are related to Twitter use. 
First, many journalists in Western countries have a Twitter 
account and use it quite actively (Artwick, 2013; Vis, 2013), 
for example, to live-tweet news events or retweet citizen 
voices (Artwick, 2013; Hermida et al., 2014). Second, 
Twitter constitutes an additional means for journalists to 
source information for their daily work (Broersma & 
Graham, 2012). This also happened during the Brussels 
attacks. A recent review showed that journalists frequently 
use online sources for their research and that Twitter is par-
ticularly popular among those (Lecheler & Kruikemeier, 
2015). Online sources like Twitter have become increasingly 
important, making it easier for journalists to research certain 
issues and quickly obtain information (Moon & Hadley, 
2014). Journalists pick tweets and use them as triggers for 
articles or broadcasting segments, as illustrations of news 
events, or as stand-alone quotes (Broersma & Graham, 2012; 
Metag & Rauchfleisch, 2016).
Research has shown that context matters for these sourc-
ing practices. Journalists’ attitudes toward the use of social 
media differ across countries (Gulyas, 2013) and organiza-
tions. Approaches to social media as news sources, for exam-
ple, differ between the BBC, the Guardian, and CNN, with 
CNN being much more open toward UGC as a source 
(Bruno, 2011). Also, public relations officers at different 
news outlets revealed different social media strategies 
(Bloom, Cleary, & North, 2015).
Twitter becoming an established and widespread tool has led 
to frictions between professional journalistic norms and the way 
online and social media are being used: “Online-related norms 
and standards such as the prioritisation of speed and immediacy, 
as well as click rates, are becoming a central benchmark for the 
entire newsroom” (Hofstetter & Schoenhagen, 2017, p. 13). 
This might lead to standard journalistic practices being neglected 
or not being followed any longer. To solve this conflict, news 
outlets developed social media guidelines, including specific 
guidelines for journalists’ use of Twitter (Canter, 2015; 
Opgenhaffen & Scheerlinck, 2013).
Verification and UGC
These general changes in journalism already outline the 
importance of UGC in contemporary news reporting and the 
necessity of the respective technical expertise to make use of 
UGC for journalists (Thurman, Cornia, & Kunert, 2016). 
Surveys and interview studies have documented that sourcing 
and verifying UGC have become an important part of the jour-
nalistic profession (e.g., Brandtzaeg, Lüders, Spangenberg, 
Rath-Wiggins, & Følstad, 2015; Heravi & Harrower, 2016). 
However, UGC is a double-edged sword for journalists: On 
one hand, it gives journalists the opportunity to diversify their 
news reporting and offer new perspectives (Matthews, 2013; 
Wardle & Dubberley, 2014). On the other hand, it challenges 
verification as a core function of journalism. This feature is 
crucial because verification is “a normative practice by which 
journalism has sought to differentiate itself from other forms 
of public communication” (Zeller & Hermida, 2015, p. 111). 
Then again, journalists more often turn to Twitter for sourcing 
than verifying UGC because verification is time-consuming 
(Heravi & Harrower, 2016).
Confronted with this new challenge, news organizations 
and journalists have developed coping strategies affecting 
organizational as well as individual working routines (Bruno, 
2011; Hermida, 2012; Hermida et al., 2014). Even traditional 
news organizations such as the BBC had introduced organiza-
tional changes when they were first confronted with UGC. 
One of the first times UGC appeared in mainstream media was 
during the London bombings in 2005 when the BBC, for the 
first time, showed images in their news reporting that were not 
filmed by BBC cameramen or camerawomen (Wardle & 
Dubberley, 2014). This event also led to the BBC establishing 
a permanent UGC Hub and to first discussions about the basic 
principles of verification practices, which were created at the 
time and remain the same until today (Barot, 2013). According 
to these rules, journalists have to establish the origin of an 
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image, confirm the location and time a picture was taken, ver-
ify the content of the picture, and obtain the permission of the 
author of a picture. Similarly, the social media guidelines of 
other news organizations have been aimed at standardizing 
verification processes when Twitter is used as a source. These 
verification methods differ, however. Some news organiza-
tions have established a two-tier verification process which 
allows, for example, that unverified information can be 
tweeted but information that appears in the outlets of the leg-
acy brand—for example, the newspaper itself or its website—
needs to be verified in a traditional journalistic manner (Canter, 
2015). These guidelines also include that journalists need to 
identify themselves as journalists working for a specific media 
outlet on Twitter (Canter, 2015).
In recent years, media organizations have started to rely 
on UGC sourced by news agencies, as they can guarantee 
verification (Matthews, 2013; Wardle & Dubberley, 2014). 
News agencies such as AP have approached UGC verifica-
tion and its legal implications more professionally because 
they eventually redistribute their sourced content (Wardle & 
Dubberley, 2014). In addition, startup news agencies like 
Storyful or Fresco that specialize in UGC verification have 
emerged (Al Omran, 2014).
In sum, source verification is still at the core of the journal-
istic practice. This is not surprising as the discipline of verifi-
cation separates journalism from other forms of communication 
such as propaganda or fiction (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014). 
Still, recent survey data show that 25% of UK journalists 
(Thurman et al., 2016) believe that it is justified to publish 
unverified content at least occasionally. Similarly, a “tweet 
first, verify later” approach (Bruno, 2011, p. 66) might release 
the time pressure journalists face nowadays, particularly 
online—but, as we pointed out earlier, it can have adverse 
legal or reputational consequences for the organization or the 
individual if the information proves wrong.
There is a rapidly growing literature on sourcing and veri-
fication of UGC in journalism, which indicates that the prac-
tice has reached mainstream media in the offline world (e.g., 
Bruno, 2011; Heravi & Harrower, 2016; Silverman, 2013). 
Studies mainly conducted qualitative interviews (e.g., 
Brandtzaeg et al., 2015; Wardle & Dubberley, 2014; Zeller & 
Hermida, 2015) or standardized surveys with journalists 
(e.g., Heravi & Harrower, 2016). Some scholars have also 
analyzed UGC used in the media or focused on UGC verifi-
cation in news organizations (e.g., Bruno, 2011; Wardle & 
Dubberley, 2014).
Surprisingly, however, sourcing and verification practices 
during times of crisis—when the urgency to be quick and 
contribute to the news cycle is even more pronounced for 
journalists—have not received much scholarly attention yet. 
In one of the few studies on the use of UGC in crises, Vis 
(2013) analyzed the Twitter use of two journalists during the 
UK riots 2011. In her study, verification was only observed 
in a few tweets. Hermida et al. (2014), who analyzed the 
sourcing practice of Andy Carvin on Twitter during the Arab 
Spring, is one of the most detailed analyses of Twitter-based 
sourcing. However, while the analyzed content is vast, the 
study only examines one single journalist who, as a social 
media strategist, does not represent the average journalist on 
Twitter and can thus only be considered as a particular case.
Systematic analyses of journalists’ Twitter verification 
practices from different contexts are lacking, however. 
Therefore, we will focus on the sourcing and verification 
practices of a large number of journalists on Twitter during a 
crisis event. As it is challenging to identify the actual use of 
social media in journalists’ news routine through surveys and 
interviews (Zeller & Hermida, 2015), we will analyze jour-
nalists’ Twitter data, thereby adding to the understanding of 
how journalists use social media in news routines.
The Role of Twitter in Crisis Journalism—And the 
Case of Terrorist Attacks
Social media and Twitter, in particular, have become impor-
tant sources for journalists, especially in times of crises. They 
can provide eyewitness images and videos, provided by “citi-
zen journalists” or “citizen photographers” (Patrick & Allan, 
2013), which have become a major part of crisis reporting 
(Anden-Papadopoulos & Pantti, 2013). During catastrophes, 
conflicts, or wars, journalists are confronted with high degrees 
of uncertainty, often have fewer sources available, are some-
times unable to be on the ground as events unfold, and there-
fore turn to social media such as Twitter for information and 
perspective (Hermida et al., 2014; Papacharissi & de Fatima 
Oliveira, 2012). In conflicts like in Syria or Iraq, journalists 
rely (more) on colleagues who are in place or on domestic 
sources (e.g., Plotkowiak, Stanoevska-Slabeva, Ebermann, 
Meckel, & Fleck, 2012). This is even more pronounced for 
unexpected, breaking news events for which journalists can-
not prepare in advance. In such situations, Twitter can become 
an especially valuable reporting tool (Bruno, 2011; Vis, 2013; 
Wardle & Dubberley, 2014). Some events appear on social 
media before they are taken up by newswires (Petrovic, 
Osborne, Mccreadie, Macdonald, & Ounis, 2013), enabling 
journalists to react more quickly to them.
Terrorist attacks—that is, the intentional use of physical 
force by non-state actors against “soft targets” such as 
civilians (cf. Gerhards & Schäfer, 2014; Tuman, 2003)—
are particularly relevant and fitting cases for such analy-
ses. First, they intend to be more than mere acts of violence. 
Terrorist attacks have been described as a “communication 
strategy in which messages are sent in a spectacular way” 
(Münkler, 2005, p. 177) to politicians and citizens or par-
ticular countries and regions. These messages aim to reso-
nate beyond the immediate victims of the attacks; they are 
intended to frighten populations and by doing so, often, to 
influence decision-makers and elites (e.g., Meggle, 2005; 
Tuman, 2003). The distribution of these messages relied to 
a significant degree on legacy media previously but 
increasingly relies on online and social media. Second, 
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terrorist attacks are unexpected crises for which journalists 
cannot prepare. Accordingly, they provide excellent cases 
along which journalists’ sourcing and validation patterns 
can be analyzed.
Research Interest and Research Questions
Since a systematic analysis of UGC and Twitter verifica-
tion practices of a larger population of journalists during 
crises events is still missing, we will provide a study of 
global journalists’ Twitter communication on the terrorist 
attacks at Brussels in March 2016. It is an appropriate case 
because most of the pictures and videos of the event that 
media used in the early stages of their coverage originated 
from Twitter. Additionally, the timing of the event made it 
more likely to observe journalists from all around the 
world. With today’s 24-hr news cycle and the high level of 
professionalization of newsrooms in the United States, we 
can also expect many US journalists in our sample.2 The 
first two bombs detonated 7:58 a.m. CET in the departure 
hall of Zaventem Airport in Brussels. The second attack 
followed at 9:11 a.m. CET in Maalbeek Metro station. 
UGC content appeared quickly in the media after the deto-
nation of the first bomb (Galvin, 2016). Scrutinizing 
Twitter communication around the Brussels bombings, we 
will focus on three research questions.
Large news organizations from the West, which are at the 
forefront of digitalization, have already adapted their organi-
zational structure to cope with UGC and adopted different 
verification procedures (Bruno, 2011). However, similar 
trends can also be observed in the Chinese context where 
journalists and citizen journalists use Weibo to source and 
verify content (Cui & Lin, 2014; Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 
2015). Besides geographical differences, we also expect 
organizational diversity as previous studies indicated (e.g., 
Wardle & Dubberley, 2014):
RQ1: Which media organizations and journalists used 
Twitter actively to source and verify content during the 
Brussels attack?
We analyze whether verification and sourcing practice 
matches the proposed best practice (Barot, 2013; Silverman, 
2013) and whether different types of sourcing practice can be 
identified. As we argued before, during crisis events, sourc-
ing of UGC becomes most likely a priority because informa-
tion through more traditional channels is not available 
(Wardle & Dubberley, 2014). Furthermore, previous case 
studies have shown that in the aftermath of a crisis fake pic-
tures circulate in the online space (cf. Matthews, 2013; 
Zubiaga & Ji, 2014). Therefore, verification is of utmost 
importance during crisis events. Still, Twitter is mostly used 
by journalists for sourcing without a strong focus on verifica-
tion (Heravi & Harrower, 2016). In our study, we are specifi-
cally interested in the breaking news phase when speed is 
crucial, which might pose an even greater challenge for jour-
nalists to adhere to their usual verification norms:
RQ2: How did journalists verify and source UGC on 
Twitter during the Brussels attack?
Finally, we analyze what content is being sought and poten-
tially verified on Twitter. In light of studies showing that media 
coverage of terrorism focuses on specific attacks (e.g., 
Weimann & Brosius, 1991) and portrays them using depic-
tions of victims and destruction, of the (potential) perpetrators, 
and of political and societal elites evaluating and condemning 
terrorist attacks (e.g., Gerhards & Schäfer, 2014), we will ana-
lyze what specific UGC journalists request and aim to verify:
RQ3: What content and information were sourced over 
Twitter during the Brussels attack?
Data and Method
Data Collection: Analyzing Twitter 
Communication During the Brussels Terrorist 
Attacks
The data collection for our study was quite challenging 
because sourcing requests from journalists cannot be identi-
fied through hashtags or keywords. Using a sample of jour-
nalists is a more feasible strategy but would probably not 
have given us access to all replies during an event because 
we hardly know in advance which journalists in the world 
will be actively sourcing tweets during the event. Therefore, 
we decided to use highly demanded tweets containing UGC 
during the incident as a starting point to identify journalists. 
Through multiple steps, this strategy eventually allowed us 
to access even source tweets that could not have been col-
lected through a keyword search.
We collected the data from Twitter during the Brussels 
attack in four steps. In a first step, we used Twitter’s applica-
tion programming interface (API) to download all tweets 
from 22 March 2016 that contained “Brussels” as a word 
(n = 4,068,904 tweets). Subsequently, we identified the two 
most popular (received number of retweets) tweets for both 
attacks which were posted in the first 30 min after each attack 
and contained UGC. Additionally, we included a tweet that 
was posted later than 30 min after the first attack but included 
one of the most widely used pictures in the press. In a second 
step, we downloaded all replies that were addressed to these 
five tweets and filtered out all replies with general comments 
from non-journalistic accounts that were not relevant for our 
analysis. Based on this collection of tweets, we downloaded 
all user information which was used as a data set for RQ1. Of 
the 115 users, 105 were journalists or media organizations. In 
a third step, we downloaded all replies written by these jour-
nalistic accounts on March 22, 2016, and used it as a data set 
for RQ2 (n = 617 relevant replies). In the last step, we 
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downloaded all unique tweets that were addressed by these 
617 relevant replies. This last step provided us with a data set 
of 243 unique tweets that contained potential UGC for RQ3.
Methods: Content Analysis of Twitter 
Communication
For each of our three datasets, we created a specific 
codebook.
RQ1: Journalists. In our first content analysis, we analyzed the 
journalistic accounts. First, we coded the type of account, the 
gender, the location of the person (first location in account), 
media type, country of media organization, job position (if 
mentioned in the description), and the professional area of 
responsibility.
RQ2: Replies. After filtering out all irrelevant replies (not 
related to the Brussels attack), we coded in a first step what 
the journalists requested. This could be content—(1) video, 
(2) picture, or (3) text—or (4) a general request for 
information.
For the content analysis of the replies from journalists, we 
used the recommended verification steps for UGC by the BBC 
that have emerged as basic, platform-independent principles: 
(1) establish the source (owner) of an image or video, (2) con-
firm the location and time the image was taken, (3) confirm the 
content of the picture, and (4) obtain the permission and rights 
to use the image or video (for an overview, see Barot, 2013).
Additionally, we also coded the politeness of a request. 
We differentiated between (1) normal and (2) polite. We clas-
sified a tweet as polite if a journalist also asked about the 
safety and general well-being of a user. The last characteris-
tic is an aspect that is also highlighted by the BBC for situa-
tions in which a user could still be in danger (Barot, 2013).
Journalists had no direct follower relationship with citi-
zens before the event and had to rely on replies as a first 
communication channel. Twitter’s character limitation 
makes it difficult to use it for longer conversations. Therefore, 
we also coded what other direct contact information journal-
ists added in the replies—(1) email address, (2) direct mes-
sages/following back, or (3) phone number—as an indicator 
of their willingness to engage with their sources for the sake 
of research and verification.
RQ3: Sources. In this part of the content analysis, we coded all 
relevant tweets that received replies from journalists. We used 
some variables from prior studies about terrorism (Gerhards & 
Schäfer, 2014; Weimann & Brosius, 1991). We first coded the 
type of user who wrote the original tweet. Then, we focused on 
the three possible source elements of a tweet: text, picture, and 
video. Apart from the location variable, all following variables 
were coded as binary variables (0 = not mentioned/depicted, 
1 = mentioned/ depicted). Our first variable was the authentic 
on-site perspective. For text, we assessed whether the tweets 
indicated that a person is on-site. Pictures and videos had to 
have an on-site perspective to be classified “on-site.” Victims 
as a general category were coded if people were running and/
or showed strong negative emotions (e.g., were crying or 
showed strong signs of despair). Additionally, we also coded 
fatal victims (e.g., if dead body remains were visible or it was 
explicitly stated in the text of a tweet) and injured victims. For 
videos and pictures, we also coded if the victims depicted 
could be identified (e.g., the face is clearly visible).
In a next step, we analyzed whether the bomb was men-
tioned/depicted, whether indicators of the attack were men-
tioned/depicted (e.g., fire, smoke, debris, injured victims, 
etc.), and for pictures or videos if they showed a chaotic situ-
ation (e.g., panic and non-normal behavior, destruction). For 
the text, we coded whether affective language was used (e.g., 
“Horrible scenery”). Eventually, we coded whether helpers 
and security personnel were mentioned or depicted: non-
professional helper (civilians), professional rescue workers, 
security force (police), and military.
Intercoder Reliability. One coder mainly coded the data for all 
three analyses. In a pretest, two coders coded a sample of 
tweets.3 Variables with low intercoder reliability were addi-
tionally reviewed after the initial test, and some clarifications 
were added to the codebooks.4 To measure intercoder reli-
ability and assess the validity of the data analysis, we then 
randomly selected 10% of the cases from each data set that 
were coded by both coders (12 accounts, 62 replies, and 25 
original tweets). Almost all of our variables for all three parts 
yielded reliable measurements (Krippendorff’s alphas >.8).5
Results
RQ1: Characteristics of Journalists Using UGC on 
Twitter
We identified relevant journalists by their replies to the most 
relevant tweets about the Brussels attacks. This led us to 105 
Twitter accounts, 14 of which were organizational accounts 
(e.g., BBC) and 89 of which were accounts of individual 
journalists (two were categorized as “other”). Of the indi-
vidual journalists, 54% were female and 47% male users.
These accounts mainly originated from the Northern hemi-
sphere and English-speaking countries. Most requests for 
information or content came from UK-based media organiza-
tions (40%). With 30 unique accounts (97%), London was the 
most frequent city. US-based media organizations were sec-
ond (17%), followed by France (12%) and Ireland (6%). Paris 
with nine journalists and New York as well as Dublin with five 
are other noteworthy locations (see Figure 1).
Most of the journalists work for TV (44%), followed by 
print media outlets (22%). Newswire and online only media 
are equally often represented (12%). The majority of the jour-
nalists (66%) describe themselves as general journalists, with 
14% specializing in video journalism and 13% in pictures.
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Additionally, we captured the job titles of the journalists if 
they were mentioned in their account descriptions. Even 
though it is difficult to compare the job positions in different 
media and newsroom cultures, the data clearly show that 
most of the analyzed accounts belong to journalists beyond 
entry- or junior-level in their respective organization. For 
example, among the journalists working for TV, one-third of 
the journalists work at least at the level of a producer in our 
sample, whereas only one journalist on the assistant level 
could be identified. Only three journalists in the entire sam-
ple were interns or trainees. Summing up, we are mainly 
talking about Anglophone male and female general journal-
ists working mostly for TV, print, or news agencies who tried 
to get information and content from Twitter during the 
attacks in Brussels.
RQ2: Sourcing and Verification
For the content analysis, we identified 617 relevant tweets.6 
In 555 (90%) of these tweets, journalists requested informa-
tion or content. Additionally, we identified 62 (10%) tweets 
in which journalists thanked users after they had agreed to a 
journalist’s request. As shown in Figure 2, a large share of all 
sourcing and verification activity occurred very quickly, 
within the first 3 hr after the initial attacks. Almost 80% of all 
replies were written before 11:00 a.m. Of the journalists, 
70% were already using Twitter to request content after the 
first attacks and before the next attack in the Maalbeek metro 
station. After 11:00 a.m., only 5% of new unique journalists 
wrote replies in our sample (see Figure 2).
The most requested content category was pictures (44%), 
followed by videos (26%). In 37% of the replies, journalists 
asked for general information about the attacks. We coded up to 
three verification requests per reply. In 62% of the tweets, jour-
nalists requested the right to use a picture or a video. Of the 
tweets, 7% had additionally a legal information attached to the 
tweet in the form of an image (see Figure 6) or as a hyperlink 
leading to a page from the news organization with detailed legal 
Figure 1. Color indicates the number of media organizations in a country; points show the location of journalists, and word clouds 
visualize all names of media organizations from Northern America, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific Region. The size of the names visualizes 
the relative frequency of a news organization in each word cloud. E.g., BBC was active with four individual accounts.
Figure 2. Cumulative percentage of the relevant replies and 
unique journalist. Dashed horizontal line indicates the moment of 
the second attack in the Maalbeek metro station.
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information. In 25% of the replies, journalists tried to verify the 
source of the content, for example, asking the person who 
posted a picture or a video whether they took it themselves. For 
example, one journalist tweeted, “Hi I work for @NBCNews. 
Did you take this? Does NBCU have permission to use for all 
partners + platforms?” A few organizations even tried to pur-
chase UGC: “Hi! Journalist at Ruptly News Agency. Do you 
own the rights of the video? We’ve [sic!] interested in purchas-
ing your video.” In contrast, verification of the location of a 
source could only be observed in as few as 9% of the replies.7 
Typically, such requests asked specifically about the current 
location of a user: “Are you outside the metro station? I am a 
producer with @CNBCi. Can we talk?” Only in 1% of the 
replies journalists attempted to verify the content. In such replies 
journalists tried, for example, to verify the location of the 
depicted content (e.g., “is this your video, is it the Maalbeek 
metro station?”)8 or tried to verify when the picture was taken 
(e.g., “can you confirm that this picture is from today”).
In a next step, we analyzed whether contact methods were 
evenly distributed over the different forms of request. Our 
results clearly show that very few contact information was 
added to requests for pictures (10%) or videos (10%), whereas 
in over half of the replies requesting general information 
(56%) contact information appeared. Overall, however, only a 
small number of journalists, 36, added contact information: 18 
unique journalists added their phone number at least once, 4 
included their email address, and 18 asked for direct messages 
as a private form of Twitter communication.
In Table 1, we combined the sourcing and verification 
requests with the different content and information requests. 
A comparison of the two results reveals that most replies 
sourcing pictures or videos requested the right to use the 
content. Replies with a verification attempt of the source, 
however, appeared only in one-third of responses requesting 
videos or pictures. By contrast, only a few instances of con-
tent verification were observed. Verification of the location 
of a user appeared, if at all, in 21% of the replies asking for 
general information, but almost never in replies asking for 
videos or pictures. Legal information was only added by 
five different journalists, who are mostly working for (digi-
tal) news agencies, in around 10% of the replies asking for 
videos or pictures.
In a penultimate step, we conducted a multiple correspon-
dence analysis (MCA; for an overview, see Di Franco, 2016) 
to summarize all measured variables. Correspondence analy-
sis is particularly useful when more than two categorical 
variables are studied, as it allows mapping these variables in 
one figure and, thus, detecting patterns within them. The 
more frequently specific options appear together in the same 
tweets, the closer they are plotted in Figure 3.
Apart from the distribution in the MCA plot, its axes can 
also be interpreted. In Figure 3, the x-axis largely represents 
the different kinds of requests journalists make. No rights and 
general information contribute to the positive pole of the 
axis, whereas content (picture or video) requests and rights 
contribute to the negative pole. Similarly, direct contact 
(e.g., phone) and no contact also have an important contribu-
tion to this dimension. The y-axis is mainly organized along 
the politeness of the replies: Polite contributes to the posi-
tive, whereas normal contributes to the negative pole of the 
axis. Verification of the location of the source is another vari-
able which contributes considerably to the y-axis.
Verification of the location of a source was mostly used in 
replies with general requests that included additionally direct 
contact requests. Most of the replies on the right-hand side in 
Figure 3 were written by journalists from broadcasting orga-
nizations.9 Replies on the left in Figure 3 were all requests for 
content. Print or online news wrote most of the replies in the 
lower part without any additional politeness, whereas news 
agencies wrote most of the polite replies in the upper part.
In conclusion, two general types of replies could be identi-
fied that differ regarding the politeness: First, there are replies 
with general information requests that include direct contact 
information and sometimes try to verify the location of the 
source. Second, there are replies with video or picture requests, 
which ask for the rights to use the material, lack further contact 
information, and do not include a verification of the location 
of the source. The latter kind of tweets was more prominent in 
our sample as the density in Figure 3 indicates.
RQ3: Sourced Tweets
In our third content analysis, we analyzed the content of the 
tweets. Figure 4 shows that most requested tweets depict 
Table 1. Cross table with sourcing and verification requests.
General information, % (n = 166) Picture, % (n = 231) Video, % (n = 144) Total, % (n = 541)
Rights 0 93 88 63
Verification source 7 36 31 26
Verification content 1 1 1 1
Verification location of source 2 4 4 9
Legal 0 10 11 8
Cross table with sourcing and verification requests. Percentages were calculated per column based on the total number of request forms. For example, 
36% of replies with picture requests included a verification of the source request. This also means that 64% of replies with picture requests were without 
a source verification. The sum of percentages exceeds 100% because several replies contained several verification requests (e.g., a source and a content 
verification request).
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chaos, and/or capture the moment of the actual bombings, and/
or include remains of the attack such as debris. These pictures 
and videos were mostly taken from an on-the-ground, eyewit-
ness perspective. Almost a quarter of the tweets across all con-
tent types include security forces. Non-professional helpers 
(30%), as well as victims (55%), were the most prominent 
people in videos. Injured victims appeared most often in pic-
tures (27%) and videos (21%). In all videos, and in almost 
one-third of the pictures with injured persons, the victims 
could be identified. In tweets only including text, users mostly 
mentioned indicators of the attack (47%) and/or tweeted just 
after the attack had occurred (65%). If people were mentioned, 
this was mainly the police (20%).
For all relevant sourced tweets (n = 198), we calculated 
the correlation between the number of received replies as a 
measure of popularity among journalists and the number of 
received likes or retweets as a measure of popularity among 
the general Twitter population. Both audience popularity 
measurements (liked: r = .78, n = 198, p > .001; retweeted: 
r = .81, n = 198, p > .001) strongly correlate with the number 
of replies each tweet received from journalists. The more 
popular a tweet was in the general Twitter population, the 
more replies it received from journalists.
We further investigated the relationship between the pop-
ularity of a tweet based on single examples. In Figure 5, we 
visualized the cumulative percentage of replies (n = 46) from 
journalists and of the number of retweets (n = 17,365)10 for 
one of the most popular tweets in our sample. In this tweet, 
posted at 8:23 a.m., a user shared a video that shows people 
running out of the airport building. The first journalist con-
tacted the user 3 min later at 8:26. Up to this point, the tweet 
had been retweeted 39 times. At 8:39 a.m., 15 min after the 
original tweet had been published, already half of the replies 
from journalists were posted. At that time, the tweet had 
already been retweeted 2,687 times.
Most of the tweets that received replies were written by 
accounts connected with media (35%) or professionals 
(34%) that explicitly mention their job position in the 
description. Only 22% of the tweets were from normal users 
without any connection to the media industry or a profes-
sional role.
Discussion
Sourcing and Verification on Twitter During the 
Brussels Attacks
Our study shows, first of all, that sourcing over Twitter has 
become a global phenomenon. Even though European jour-
nalists were most strongly represented in our sample, most 
likely due to the geographic closeness to the event, requests 
for UGC were not limited to the continent. Second, the high 
Figure 3. MCA with two dimensions. Dimension 1 (30% explained variance) covers mainly the content (general information vs. 
content), contact information, and rights. Dimension 2 (15% explained variance) includes mostly the politeness. Points visualize replies, 
color the different categorical variables. n = 541 replies. Circles indicate density. For each quadrant, an example reply was added.
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number of general journalists without a particular job task is 
a clear sign of the increased importance of “multiskilling” 
(Van der Haak et al., 2012; Wallace, 2013) in newsrooms. 
The many TV producers in our study that covered the 
Brussels attacks and used Twitter as a source to obtain the 
first pictures directly from the location of the attack also 
exemplify the importance of “multiskilling.” Finally, the 
identified organizations, especially the startup news agen-
cies, and the job titles of journalists that indicate their level 
of experience, are a strong sign of professionalization in the 
context of UGC sourcing.
We identified two types of requests for UGC. In the first 
type, all kinds of media organizations requested content. Most 
journalists sourcing content only asked for the right to use the 
content but did not ask whether the user actually owned the con-
tent. News services and large organizations such as the BBC 
were among the few identified organizations that regularly 
inquired about ownership of the material as well. Furthermore, 
legal information was only included in few requests even though 
this constitutes a problematic aspect of UGC sourcing (Wardle 
& Dubberley, 2014). Therefore, it was not surprising that only 
news agencies such as AP and the startup Storyful used addi-
tional legal forms in their requests (e.g., Figure 6). The high 
level of professionalism of news agencies is also reflected in 
their polite replies asking for UGC. The second type of request 
came mostly from broadcasting companies that were addition-
ally interested in the users as sources in their live coverage (e.g., 
via telephone interviews).
The location of the source was almost never verified 
over replies. In the context of a crisis event at an early 
stage, this is less problematic as the results of our third 
analysis indicate: Most tweets included a description of 
the location and the sourced users were either media-
related people or professionals. Furthermore, most sourced 
tweets appeared in the first hour after the attack, when the 
risk of fake content is lower.11 The location can also be 
verified through the timelines of the user or the informa-
tion in the account description, as described by Wardle 
(2013). The content itself, however, was also almost never 
verified, even though this is the most problematic aspect 
of UGC. In our case, the missing content verification is 
less problematic because in most pictures or videos the 
location could be easily verified through visual indicators. 
Moreover, most sourced users did appear on Twitter in 
their professional role and not anonymous and were thus 
more trustworthy.
Journalists mostly sourced videos and pictures that had an 
on-site perspective and depicted a chaotic situation with 
indicators of the attack visible in the images. The results of 
our time analysis clearly indicate that most journalists are 
Figure 4. We analyzed 42 tweets with a video, 107 with 
pictures and 49 with only text. The percentage was calculated in 
each content category.
Figure 5. Cumulative percentage of the number of received replies 
and retweets for the most popular tweet. Dashed horizontal line 
indicates the moment half of all replies had been written.
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extremely quick in sourcing because they profit from 
Twitter’s platform specific speed. When the sourcing started, 
tweets usually had not been retweeted a lot, but they had 
already an extreme acceleration (as can be seen in Figure 5) 
and were thus most likely prioritized by the Twitter algo-
rithm in keyword searches.
Some of the pictures in our sample were re-shared pictures 
with pixelation of fatal or injured victims. Despite this occa-
sional pixelation in images, which was mostly done by the 
journalists re-sharing them, videos did not have pixelation 
even when victims could be identified. Finally, almost one-
third of the tweets were written by media-related users. Some 
of the journalists just shared content from other users without 
any further information. As these tweets were just shared 
without any additional verification-related information, most 
of them received requests from other journalists (e.g., the 
example with the video in the introduction). Other journalists 
were at the airport as travelers or near the metro station when 
the attacks occurred and shared their content. Choosing 
Brussels, the de facto capital of the European Union where 
many international journalists and professionals are stationed, 
as a target helped the terrorists to increase the mediated 
impact of their attack.
Ethical Implications
From these results, several ethical questions arise. For 
journalists, crisis events such as terrorist attacks, catastro-
phes, or accidents are cases of heightened uncertainty. In 
such situations, journalists must gather information about 
the events quickly and without preparation, and tell their 
audiences what has happened, where, why, and how. At the 
same time, journalists have to make sure this information 
is accurate.
Twitter can be a useful tool for journalists in such situ-
ations to gather information and cross-validate judgments 
with other users. Our analysis showed, however, that many 
journalists do not try to verify the information in other 
users’ tweets. At least in their direct exchanges with their 
sources, many do not attempt to check the authenticity of 
Figure 6. Reply with an attached Social Media Release Form from an AP editor to one of the first pictures from the airport after the 
attack.
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the pictures or information obtained. This has a number of 
problematic implications. Journalists can get information 
wrong or could even make themselves vulnerable to 
manipulations. This problem is aggravated by journalists’ 
“group orientation” (Donsbach, 2004, p. 139): Journalists 
tend to watch their colleagues closely to cross-validate 
their news decisions, particularly in situations of uncer-
tainty. Such a tendency was clearly visible in our introduc-
tory case where one journalist, Anna Ahronheim, tweeted 
unverified information and other journalists distributed it 
in their news coverage on TV and online news pages with-
out validating it.
Cases such as this indicate that, as of yet, journalists’ 
UGC sourcing and verification practices, as well as poten-
tially the respective editorial guidelines, are not sufficient. 
First, verification procedures differ across newsrooms in 
general (Shapiro, Brin, Bédard-Brûlé, & Mychajlowycz, 
2013) and with respect to the use of information on Twitter 
in particular (Canter, 2015). In other words, there is no 
commonly approved method to verify information from 
social media in journalism, which makes it hard for jour-
nalists to effectively bypass the risks of spreading unveri-
fied information, for example, due to group processes, 
time pressure, or competition (Post, 2013). Second, a two-
tier system verification—whereby journalists can tweet 
unverified information but must not distribute it in their 
actual news publications—can only be effective and pre-
vent unverified information from entering the news if jour-
nalists make unverified information transparent in their 
tweets. At present, no such commonly accepted labeling 
exists. Thus, even using their colleagues’ tweets, journal-
ists cannot distinguish unverified from verified informa-
tion. All in all, journalists should be aware of the fact that 
they can only distinguish themselves from so-called citi-
zen journalists and maintain their credibility as a profes-
sion by adhering to a set of professionally approved 
standards to ensure accuracy in reporting (Mothes, 2016). 
Such standards should be further developed for the use of 
Twitter—not just in individual newsrooms but also in jour-
nalism in general.
Apart from the journalists’ duty to inform their audi-
ences as accurately as possible, there are other ethical 
problems they need to be aware of. For example, journal-
ists’ distribution of videos or photographs frequently iden-
tifies the people involved—for instance, individuals in 
grief or panic, fatal or injured victims. Such practices do 
not only touch upon people’s personality rights, but jour-
nalists should be aware that they might even promote ter-
rorists’ agendas because a crucial strategy of terrorism is 
the “intimidation of a large audience, beyond that of the 
immediate victims” (Sandler & Enders, 2007, p. 288). 
When events are still unfolding, posting pictures might 
also reveal useful tactical information to the perpetrators, 
such as the police’s position on site, as was the case in the 
Munich attacks in July 2016.12
Generalizability of the Results and Future 
Research
Even though we have only analyzed one event, our results 
can be generalized to quite an extent. Journalists from our 
sample were also sourcing during other crisis events in Nice 
and Turkey in July 2016, even though those crises happened 
in the evening.13 Of course, we could not analyze all journal-
ists in the world sourcing during crisis events, but we cov-
ered at least all journalists on duty on the morning of the 
Brussels attacks that attracted global attention. When we 
additionally checked other sourced tweets besides our origi-
nal five tweets, we could only identify a few journalists that 
were not included in our sample.
While the speed, the type of requests, and the scale of the 
sourcing and verification observed in this study can be gener-
alized for other crisis events, different ethical questions arise. 
In revolutions, wars, or situations with ongoing active terrorist 
attacks, possible sources have to be protected, and the publica-
tion of pictures might have direct negative effects (e.g., the 
tactical position of the police during the Munich attacks).
Future research should further investigate how sourcing 
practice is changing and what coping strategies will emerge 
(e.g., labeling of verified UGC). Also, it would be fruitful to 
analyze the use of the sourced UGC in the media and to evalu-
ate whether it was verified. Quantitative studies, such as ours, 
could be combined with interviews with journalists to learn 
more about their reasoning and possible ethical concerns. 
Finally, future research should extend our research with other 
platforms such as Periscope, Instagram, or Snapchat.14
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Notes
 1. During a crisis event, at least the initial contact to a source is 
openly available on Twitter since most journalists do not have 
direct contact information and have to rely on replies.
 2. US journalists usually are the most active journalists during 
crisis events, especially if they happen locally.
 3. Two coders double-coded 30 accounts, 40 replies, and 40 orig-
inal tweets in an initial test.
 4. “Chaotic situation” in the text of tweets could not initially 
reach a sufficient intercoder reliability in a pretest and we did 
not see a way to find a clear definition for text-only. Therefore, 
we dropped this variable for text-only.
12 Social Media + Society
 5. The variables below .8 were “professional area of responsibil-
ity” (.75), “Indicator of attack” in text (.75), “affective lan-
guage” (.71), and “victim” in video (.78).
 6. Some journalists used even two replies in order to add all 
requests and keep a polite tone.
 7. From this point on, we analyzed only the tweets that contained 
content or information requests (n = 541) and excluded 14 
tweets that included neither.
 8. English translation of the French reply: “est-ce votre video, 
c’est bien la station de metro Maelbeeck?”
 9. For the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), we com-
bined TV, radio, and broadcasting into broadcasting.
10. We included all retweets that were posted before the last reply 
of a journalist which was written around noon.
11. In our data, we identified only a few discussions and warn-
ings about fake content. The trustworthiness of the user and 
the immediacy of the tweets limit the risk for fake content.
12. We observed one such case during the Munich attacks in July.
13. Around 20% of the journalists in our sample also sourced 
tweets during the Nice attack and the military coup in Turkey.
14. In our sample, we had some tweets with hyperlinks to peri-
scope live streams.
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